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RELATIONS  BETWEEN  OIL  PROWCERS  AND  CONSUMERS: 
DIALOGUE  OR  CONFRONTATION? 
More  than a year and  a  half have passed now  since the oil crisis blew up, 
or rather since it reached political flashpoint with the unilateral 
decision of a  group of producer countries to take their destinies in 
their·own hands when,  in Kuwait  on 16  October 1973,  they resolved to 
control output  and  prices themselves.  They  were  able to take this 
eminently political decision so  unexpectedly under  cover of another 
crisis,  equa.Ity political, which  was  rocking a  Middle East  already in 
turmoil.  This was  the pretext offered by the Yom  Kippur  vlar.  But, 
as I  have  alre~ said elsewhere,  the OAPEC  was  in a  position to take 
this decision only because it was  the sequel  to a  process,  a 
development  in the world oil market  situation.  The  extremely  sharp 
rise in oil consumption,  the excessive role - indeed the almost 
privileged role - pl~ed by  oil in our total consumption of  ener~, 
the steady slide of the market  from  surplus to relative shortfall, 
largely as  a  result of the  emergence  of the USA  as  a  major net  importer 
of petroleum,  together with the upsurge of nationalism in the producer 
countries and  their organization as  a  cartel:  these were  the main 
factors which  enabled  a  single spark to detonate  a  major crisis.  And 
we  are still feeling the effects of this  tod~  • 
. 
Basically,  the situation has scarcely changed.  Admittedly,  there is less 
tension on  the oil market.  There  is now  i  surplus production capacity esti-
mated  at some  6 million barrels per day.  The  supply crisis has been resolved 
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directly;  petroleum is in abundant  supply and the  economic  repercussions 
of the price increases have  been found to be  less serious than expected. 
Indeed,  do  we  not hear on all sides that worldwide  inflation is not the 
result only of the rise in oil prices?  Do  we  not hear that the  scale 
of the problem of recycling the  capital which  the producer countries 
suddenly have  on  their hands is less serious than had been feared?  Have 
we  no~ concluded that the  problems are manageable? 
I  would  agree that the  world economy  has  show.n  a  tremendous  capacity for 
absorption.  Economic  systems,  particularly financial  systems,  have 
adjusted amazingly quickly.  But,  while this prodigious adaptability 
means  that pessimism is certainly not in order,  I·cannot help feeling 
that our energy supply situation is still bedevilled by too  much  uncertainty, 
that we  are getting bogged dolin  in detail in the  elaboration of policies 
on  substitute products to replace  imported petroleum,  and  that energy 
costs are still weighing  dolvn  heavily on  an  economy  whose  outlook is 
uncertain and  l'rhich  is mortgaged virtually to  the  limit. 
Our  position is indeed unstable  and unsure.  It is possible that the 
excess  supply of oil in the  market is only an appearance:  a.  mild winter 
and the  cutback in energy consumption  provoked by the economic depression 
provide  much  more  reliable explanations of the  state of the  market  th~~ 
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the alleged success of the  energy-saving policies vJhich  industrialized countries 
have  apparently been able to pursue all of a  sudden.  Let  us get one  fact 
straight:  the  savings  >ve  m2.de  in  1974  were  forced upon us.  Uo  coru1try has 
genuinely established a  rigorous  and  -vwrthwhile  pro{;"ramme  for restricting 
energy consumption. 
On  the  supply side too,  the  situation is still the  sa.me  as that Hhich  spo.rked  o:r'f 
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the 1973  crisis.  Producer countries are still both willing and  able to 
cut down  the flow  of oil.  It ~  well be that the OPEC  presents a  less 
united front than before, for some  of its members  have  embarked  upon 
investment programmes  on  such a  scale that they are pretty. well forced 
to continue  stepping up  production while others, the richer among  them, 
could easily put. the brakes on.  But  the firmness of the tone adopted by 
the representatives of the producer side at the Paris preparatory meeting 
leaves me  in no  doubt  as to their determination.  It seems  to me  that 
their determination is further backed up  by their very skillfully expressed 
desire to stand up  as the poor nations' friend.  We  are all v1ell  aware 
that what  one  might  call the "trialogue" between producer countries, rich 
consumer  countries and  poor consumer  countries, which  certain of us hoped 
would  get under way  in the International Energy  Conference  proposed by 
President Giscard d 'Estaing, will end  up  as a  debate vli th the rich on  one 
side and  the poor on  the other.  Here, it is curious to note that the 
producer countries have  accused the industrialized countries of setting 
up  a  consumers'  front in the  OECD' s  International Energy Agency.,  tihile 
their Hhole  strategy has been to establish a  dual front on  the other side, 
one  of producer countries  (OPEC)  and  one  of needy countries.  Cheerfully 
changing from front to front to suit the cause, playing on  their 
ambivalent  status as Third World  countries, the diplomats of certain 
producer countries are making full use  of the pressure  they can bring 
to bear on  an industrialized vtorld  sunk  axle~eep in the quicksands of 
its energy needs,  trying to remain wealthy but ashamed  to  say so  to the 
poor countries. 
In fact,  there is no  need for the producer countries to present a  united 
front all the  time  in order to keep  us guessing at the  outlook for our 
supplies.  It is enough  for them  to do  so  at times of crisis.  B,y 
relaxing their position they foster the  climate of optimism and 
tergiverZ.d.tion uhich makes  it so  tempting to put off the political 
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decisions which are so essential for the long term. 
We  are in danger of prolonging this period of blurred and ambiguous 
procrastination, vacillating between dialogue and confrontation with the 
producers. 
There "is one  point I  should like to make  here, an important one, as regards 
the pretexts for acute confrontation.  These  are still present.  No 
settlement has been reached in the  ~fiddle East,  and  each development  on 
the international political scene  simply brings us up  against nel-l  unknown 
factors.  Apart from  the question of Israel,  ther~.are other pretexts, no 
less worrying in a  part of the world where  the idea of "playing with fire" 
is not  just a  figure of speech. 
The  ambiguity of the situation lies not only in the organization of a 
dialogue,  as can be  seen clearly from  the difficulties now  being-·met  in 
Paris simply in drm'ling up  the agenda for an international conference 1-1here 
petroleum l'rould  be  one  item among  others, but also in the positions taken 
by  each  camp. 
As  I  have  already said,  the producer countries are playing at  ~iO tables; 
they are exploiting their power  while  taking advantage  of the fact  that 
they belong to- the -·Third  t·lorld.  They,  too,  may  hesitate as to lvhat  they 
are really aiming for:  are they to cut back their production and  use up 
their reserve  stocks,  are they to put their spare capital into development 
programmes,  or are they to  go  for the profits to be  drruvn  out of the  economic 
and  financial  systems of the industrialized world? 
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Another thing is that they differ the one  from the other:  they 
differ socially, economically and politically.  The  only things which 
a  country as vast, diversified, densely populated and socialist-
oriented as the People's Republic of Algeria has in common  with the 
Emirate  of Abu  lllabi are oil, religion and  language. 
Yet  the consumer  countries are  even more  divided.  Firstly, there is 
the radical difference in the degree of economic  development which 
separates rich and poor,  even though  the poor  stand to gain a  great 
deal if the rich bring pressure to bear on the producers to cut 
their energy bill. 
But  the rich countries,  the industrialized countries, are not  so 
closely knit as the producer countries allege.  Admittedly,  there 
is the International Energy  Agreement  signed in Paris on  18  November 
last year.  However,  a  number  of countries, among  them France·,- are 
not taking part in the Agreement;  this is one  factor making for 
diversity, which  some  find irksome  and  some  find pleasing. 
But  within the Agency,  although the parties to the Agreement  have 
paid lip-service to the idea of cooperation,  are they ready to make 
the efforts needed in order to prove  that they really wish to 
cooperate?  There  is a  world of difference  be~ieen the  commitment 
entered into by a  State in signing a.  general declaration of a 
diplomatic and  pcHi tical nature  and  a21  undertaking -vrhich  binds it to 
take  concrete  measures  affecting public funds  and  the budget. 
Here  t·re  cannot help but  conclude  that -vre  have  not yet  gone  particularly 
far in expressin~ international solidarity in any form  other than 
declarations of intent.  The  only really binding conrnitment  so  far 
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entered into is the  machiner,y for allocating oil resources in times 
of crisis.  All  the other programmes  are still at the  intention 
stage and,  let us bear this in mind,  will require further international 
agreements which will apparently have  to operate  case  by  case,  whether 
the  promotion of alternative resources or research and development 
are  involved. 
The  interests of the  consumer  countries are not always  the  same. 
America,  Europe  and Japan have  basic grounds for advocating courses 
of action which  may  well differ.  Take  the  question of the "floor 
pricen,  for instance,  where  there are in fact  two  lines of argument. 
America has its own  energy resources whose  development  would  be 
guaranteed if the  threshold of profitability of private investment 
was  also guaranteed.  But  this will only be  possible if the price 
of the reference  source  of energy,  in this case oil,  cannot vary 
too much  nor fall  so  sharply as to  jeopardize decisions already 
taken  to invest in alternative  sources of energy.  The  proposed 
floor-price  system is based  on  the  fundamental  A~erican belief in 
a  market  economy  operating subject to "safeguards".  For Europe, 
the  really fundamental  question v10uld  be  the  level of the  floor 
price,  for there  is little doubt  that the  negotiations v:hich  must 
eventually get under way  with  the  producer  countries· vii 11  hinee  upon 
this.  Furthermore,  there is a  long-standing conviction in Europe 
that  special financing arrangements  (deficiency payments)  can  be  . 
set up  l-Then  the  situation so  requires.  ·This is why  we  have  spoken 
in favour of a  system involving three"reference  price  levels:  the 
first would  be  relatively low  and would  set a  limit below vlhich 
market  forces  \·;ould  play freely;  secondly,  there would  be  a  price 
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level at which financing and guarantee measures would  be taken for the 
development  of alternative sources;  the third level. would  correspond 
to specific measures of restricted scope paid for out of public fUnds 
without direct consideration for the general level of prices  • 
• 
This simple example  sho~~s just how  far the consumer  countries are from 
adop~ing a  consistent approach.  It is hardly surprising if  we  cannot 
see where  we  are going in the dialogue with the producer countries. 
Our interests are not the same,  our ideas do  not run along the same 
lines,  and  the result is procedural disagreement  such as that witnessed 
at the preparatory meeting for the international  conference canvassed 
by President Giscard d'Estaing. 
The  question is now  why  the preparatory meeting in Paris did not 
achieve success? 
In my  opinion,  there are  some  principle reasons involved,  as  w~.ll as 
reasons related to procedure and  timing. 
As  for the principles,  I  must  admit  that the Parties involved came  to 
preparatory meeting with opposed  interests and  views  concerning the real 
goal to achieve in the main  conference and  the  cont~act within which the 
various issues would  be discussed.  In fact,  while the industrialized 
countries had  in mind  a  discussion centered around  energy,  the others 
wanted  to  profit~of such an  occasion to debate the whole  range of issues 
relating to the establishment of a  new  world  economic order. 
As  far as the procedure is concerned,  widely differing views  were  presented 
by the Parties concerning such issues as the partj.cipation of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency  to the main  conference and  to a  certain extent, its 
composition. 
Last but not  least,  the timing of the preparatory meeting was  perhaps 
fixed without  having given  enough  opportunities to sufficient preparatives 
and preliminary contacts through the appropriate  channels. 
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T.bis  meeting has undoubtedly brought us some  useful. lessons. 
The  most  important one,  in my  opinion,  beeing the demonstration of cohesion 
among  the Third World  and  the emergence  role of some  oil producing countries 
as its leaders: 
This  cohesion has represented a  decisive factor in the development of the 
debates,  and  it must  be undervalued in devising our future strategy. 
However,  it appeared also, during the discussions,  that a  certain number 
of basic problems,  linked to energy are  common  to all Parties, and that 
a  solution to them  must  be  seeked only through cooperation. 
In particular, it was  recognized-that  such problems as raw materials and 
development  could not find equitable solution without the will of the 
industrialized world. 
That  meeting at least provided an  opportunity to highlight the really 
fundamental  questions.  These  are the extension of the dialogue to 
'• 
products other than oil, the problem  of in4exation and  guaranteeing 
the incomes  of producers.  There is also the problem of the participation 
of producer and  consumer  organizations in such conferences.  The  main 
problem,  however,  is the truly remarkable phenomenon  of the 
politicization of the whole  dialogue,  which  amply illustrates the fact 
that the oil market  is not and  will never be  what  it was  in the past 
when  deliveries and  prices were  decided on  at the headquarters of the 
oil companies.  Henceforth,  the  game  will be  payed between States. It 
is up  to them  to decide tV'hether  or not· they want  a  dialogue,  whether or 
not  they want  to avoid  confrontation. 
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